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ARTICLE

COVID-19, CHURCHES,
WARS

AND

CULTURE

JOHN INAZU*

The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause often requires courts and
officials to balance competing interests of the highest order.1 On the one
hand, the Constitution recognizes the free exercise of religion as a fundamental right. On the other hand, the government sometimes has compelling
reasons for limiting free exercise, especially in situations involving dangers
to health and safety. The shutdown and social distancing orders arising out
of the COVID-19 pandemic raised the stakes on both sides of this equation.
They not only restricted free exercise but also curtailed what many people
consider to be the core of that exercise: religious worship. But the orders
did so in order to stop the spread of a deadly virus, a public health interest
of the highest order. These already high constitutional stakes were further
heightened by a rapidly changing pandemic, a heated presidential election,
and Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s Supreme Court appointment, all of which
fueled the fire of the culture wars. This article explores the free exercise
implications of the Court’s resolution of challenges to the COVID-19 shutdown orders through these constitutional and cultural lenses.

* Sally D. Danforth Distinguished Professor of Law and Religion, Washington University
in St. Louis. Portions of this Article draw from previous essays including Close the Churches,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/close-churches/
608236; Obeying God Rather than Men? What’s Really a Religious Liberty Issue?, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY (July 31, 2020), https://www.christianitytoday.com/edstetzer/2020/july/obeying-godrather-than-men.html; SCOTUS Gets it Right on Religious Liberty, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Nov.
26, 2020), https://www.christianitytoday.com/edstetzer/2020/november/scotus-gets-it-right-religi
ous-liberty-church-is-essential.html. Thanks to Chad Flanders for comments on an earlier version
of this Article, and to Clare Carter, Seth Reid, and Alex Siemers for research assistance. Thanks
also to Zachary Port, Brandon Mickelsen, Tyler Wessman-Conroy, and Mary Clare Mulcahy at
the University of St. Thomas Law Journal.
1. See Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“[O]nly those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion.”).
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BACKGROUND

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court responded to five
significant requests for injunctive relief involving worship: South Bay
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,2 Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v.
Sisolak,3 Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,4 South Bay
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom II,5 and Tandon v. Newsom.6
South Bay was decided in May 2020 in response to reopening plans
outlined by California Governor Gavin Newsom and officials in San Diego
County. The plans allowed retail stores, offices, restaurants, and schools to
open but kept houses of worship closed.7 South Bay United Pentecostal
Church argued that these orders were unconstitutional because they discriminated against religious organizations.8 After losing its request for injunctive relief at the district court and the Ninth Circuit, the church
appealed to the Supreme Court. By that time, the San Diego County Health
Department had issued an order allowing churches to hold services, as long
as they: (1) limited attendance to 25 percent of their building capacity or a
maximum of one hundred people (whichever was lower); and (2) practiced
social distancing.9 South Bay argued it was still harmed by the new guidelines because its building seated 600, and its attendance was normally
somewhere between 200 and 300.10 The Supreme Court denied the request.
Chief Justice Roberts concurred, emphasizing relevant differences between
those activities permitted to remain open on the one hand, and churches and
other restricted activities on the other.11 Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, disagreed and argued that the Court should have
2. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020).
3. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020).
4. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
5. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021).
6. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021).
7. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he
Order exempts or treats more leniently . . . dissimilar activities, such as operating grocery stores,
banks, and laundromats . . . .”).
8. Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction Relief Requested by Sunday, May 24,
2020 at 1, S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. (No. 19A1044).
9. See Opposition of State Respondents to Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction at
11, S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. (No. 19A1044).
10. The state emphasized that the church had not asked for an order blocking the enforcement of the new guidance in the lower courts and argued that the church could add more services
if it wanted to ensure that everyone could attend. Id. at 14–15.
11. Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the “comparable secular gatherings” were activities
such as “lectures, concerts, movie showings, spectator sports, and theatrical performances,” since
those were where “large groups of people gather in close proximity for extended periods of time.”
S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613. Although the order exempted or treated
more favorably some activities like grocery stores and banks, Chief Justice Roberts contended that
these were “dissimilar activities” where “people neither congregate in large groups nor remain in
close proximity for extended periods.” Id.
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applied strict scrutiny because the order treated similarly situated activities
more favorably than worship gatherings.12
In July 2020, the Court decided Calvary Chapel in response to Nevada
Governor Steve Sisolak’s order limiting “[c]ommunities of worship and
faith-based organizations” to fifty people for in-person services.13 The order
imposed less onerous restrictions on bowling alleys, restaurants, gyms,
pools, and other businesses, allowing them to reopen at 50 percent capacity.14 And it subjected casinos to a 50 percent occupancy limit on each
gaming area.15 Calvary Chapel argued that the order was unconstitutional
because it discriminated against the free exercise of religion.16 The Supreme Court denied its request for relief.17
Diocese v. Cuomo came just before Thanksgiving, in response to New
York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s restrictions. Governor Cuomo created
different zones based on infection rates and imposed heightened restrictions
corresponding to those zones. The most restrictive zone, the red zone, limited in-person gatherings to the lesser of ten people or 25 percent of maximum capacity.18 The orange zone relaxed those restrictions to the lesser of
12. Id. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief).
13. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 20-cv-00303, 2020 WL 4260438, at *1
(D. Nev. June 11, 2020), rev’d, 982 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2020); Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v.
Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020).
14. Nev. Declaration of Emergency Directive 021 - Phase Two Reopening Plan §§ 20, 25,
26, 28, 29 (May 28, 2020), https://gov.nv.gov/News/Emergency_Orders/2020/2020-05-28__COVID-19_Declaration_of_Emergency_Directive_021__Phase_Two_Reopening_Plan_(Attach
ments) [hereinafter Nev. Declaration].
15. Id. § 20.
16. The district court denied a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, and the district court and the Ninth Circuit both denied an injunction pending appeal.
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley, 2020 WL 4260438, at *1 (denying temporary restraining order
and emergency motion for preliminary injunction); Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No.
20-cv-00303, 2020 WL 3404700, at *2 (D. Nev. June 19, 2020) (denying motion for an injunction); Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 20-16169, 2020 WL 4274901, at *1 (9th Cir.
July 2, 2020) (denying emergency motion for injunctive relief pending appeal).
17. Although movie theaters, museums, and trade schools were restricted to the lesser of fifty
persons or 50 percent of the building’s capacity, see Nev. Declaration §§ 20, 30, arcades and
bowling alleys were only required to be at 50 percent capacity. Id. § 20. Seizing on Chief Justice
Roberts’s conclusion in South Bay that theaters were comparable to religious gatherings, Nevada
argued that its order treated religious gatherings the same as non-religious gatherings because
theaters were also restricted to a fifty-person limit. Respondents Steve Sisolak and Aaron D.
Ford’s Response to Emergency Application for an Injunction and Respondent Frank Hunewil’s
Limited Joinder Thereto at 15, Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020)
(No. 19A1070). Nevada further argued that those activities it treated differently than religious
gatherings, such as restaurants and casinos, were not comparable to religious gatherings. Id. at
17–18. As a decision without an opinion, the Court’s reason for denying the application for injunctive relief remains unclear. However, given Chief Justice Roberts’s rationale in South Bay that
theaters are like religious gatherings and that grocery stores and banks are not like religious gatherings, S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) it is likely
that the Court found Nevada also treated similar activities alike.
18. Governor Cuomo Announces New Cluster Action Initiative, New York State (Oct. 6,
2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-new-cluster-action-initia
tive [hereinafter NY Order].
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twenty-five people or 33 percent of maximum capacity.19 While houses of
worship were capped at ten persons in red zones, “essential” businesses—
including “acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, garages, . . . plants manufacturing chemicals and microelectronics”—could admit as many people as
they wished.20 The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and Agudath
Israel of America challenged red and orange zone designations affecting
religious gatherings.21 The Supreme Court granted the request for emergency relief after concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits of their free exercise claim alleging discriminatory treatment of religious organizations.22
In February 2021, the Supreme Court relied on Diocese v. Cuomo to
grant partial injunctive relief to churches objecting to California’s COVID19. Id. The governor also designated yellow zones, where in-person gatherings are limited to
50 percent capacity. Id.
20. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020) (per curiam).
21. Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction at i, 23, Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct.
63 (No. 20A87).
22. Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 63. The petitioners attested—without contradiction
from the state—that they had “complied with all public health guidance, ha[d] implemented additional precautionary measures, and ha[d] operated at 25% or 33% capacity for months without a
single outbreak.” Id. at 66. But the petitioners claimed that Governor Cuomo had targeted religious gatherings for harsher treatment than “comparable secular facilities.” Id. Although noting that
the remarks were not outcome-determinative, the Court cited the dissent in the appellate court for
evidence that the “challenged rules can be viewed as targeting the ‘ultra-Orthodox [Jewish] community.’” Id. (quoting Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 980 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2020) (Park, J.,
dissenting)) (alteration in lower court opinion). One of the petitioner’s alleged that the zones
subject to restriction evidence the “Governor’s targeting of Orthodox Jewish communities.” Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction Relief Requested by 3:00 PM on Friday, Nov. 20, 2020
at 5–11, Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 889 (2020) (No. 20A90) [hereinafter Agudath
Israel Petition]. See generally Audio & Rush Transcript: Governor Cuomo is a Guest on CNN
Newsroom with Poppy Harlow and Jim Sciutto, New York State, (Oct. 9, 2020), https://
www.governor.ny.gov/news/audio-rush-transcript-governor-cuomo-guest-cnn-newsroom-poppyharlow-and-jim-sciutto (transcribing Governor Cuomo’s explanation of the zones targeted). In an
interview, Governor Cuomo acknowledged that they were targeting “a couple of unique clusters,
frankly, which are more religious organizations,” because those clusters had higher rates of infection. Id. In issuing the order, Governor Cuomo acknowledged that this order is “right on the line
of government intrusion on religion.” Nicole Hong & Liam Stack, Cuomo’s Restrictions on Synagogues in Virus Hot Spots Can Go Forward, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/09/
nyregion/cuomo-synagogues.html (Nov. 16, 2020). Some Orthodox Jews in the Boroughs Park
neighborhood protested following the new order, “light[ing] masks on fire and attack[ing] at least
three people, including two local men accused of disloyalty to the Hasidic community.” Id. In
May, long before the contested order, as churches reopened, the Diocese did not initially offer
public Mass and waited a week after it was legally authorized before reopening in-person weekday services. Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction at 9, Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct.
63 (No. 20A87). The synagogues suing in Agudath Israel attest that they adopted “rigorous health
protocols,” including the splitting of traditional services to accommodate social distancing and
requiring masks during the “entirety of their religious services.” Agudath Israel Petition, supra, at
5. Given the efforts these religious organizations attested to making to comply with COVID-19
restrictions and the explicit targeting of Orthodox Jewish neighborhoods for restrictions, the case
raised the concern of state animus toward religion, such as existed in Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd.
v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). See Agudath Israel Petition, supra, at 19–25
(not labeling the question “animus” but discussing Masterpiece extensively).
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19 restrictions in South Bay II.23 While allowing percentage capacity limitations and a prohibition on singing and chanting during indoor services, the
Court enjoined California from enforcing a total prohibition on indoor worship services.24
In April 2021, the Court yet again enjoined California’s COVID-19
restrictions in Tandon—this time, with respect to at-home religious gatherings.25 The Court began with a potentially significant development in free
exercise law, noting that “government regulations are not neutral and generally applicable, and therefore trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise
Clause, whenever they treat any comparable secular activity more favorably
than religious exercise.”26 This language built upon the Court’s free exercise framework holding that generally applicable and neutral laws need
only survive rational basis scrutiny against free exercise challenges.27 The
Court had previously hinted at the meaning of both “generally applicable”
and “neutral,”28 but Tandon was the first time the Court had concluded that
a single comparable secular activity treated more favorably than religious
exercise would trigger strict scrutiny.29
The Court next determined that in assessing California’s restrictions,
the “comparability [of religious and secular activities] is concerned with the
risks various activities pose, not the reasons why people gather.”30 The
Court emphasized the government’s burden of satisfying strict scrutiny and
concluded it had not been met.31 Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor, finding that the California regulations applied
equally to at-home activities, whether religious or secular, and that the
proper comparator for at-home religious activities is at-home secular activities rather than “hardware stores and hair salons.”32
The five decisions summarized above are not the only free exercise
challenges to COVID-19 shutdown orders. In December 2020, the Court
considered and rejected a request for injunctive relief for religious
schools,33 and it remanded several other cases in light of its decision in
23. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 719 (2021).
24. Id. at 719–20.
25. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296–97 (2021).
26. Id. at 1296.
27. Emp. Div. Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).
28. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543–46 (1993);
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018).
29. Then-Judge Alito had reached a similar conclusion in Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a police department’s policy prohibiting
officers from wearing beards must include a religious exception because it authorized exemptions
for medical reasons).
30. Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1296.
31. Id. at 1296–97. The Court also noted that a case is not necessarily mooted upon the
modification or lifting of COVID-19 restrictions, particularly when such restrictions could be
reinstated. Id. at 1297.
32. Id. at 1298 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
33. Danville Christian Acad., Inc. v. Beshear, 141 S. Ct. 527, 528 (2020).
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Diocese v. Cuomo.34 And a number of lower courts have addressed other
COVID-19 restrictions.35
34. See, e.g., Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1289, 1289–90 (2021); Gish
v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1290, 1290 (2021); Gateway City Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1460,
1460 (2021). Justice Gorsuch also rejected a church’s request for injunctive relief in Denver Bible
Church v. Polis, No. 20-1391, 2021 WL 2379811, at *28 (10th Cir. June 9, 2021), appl. for inj.
denied, No. 20A163 (U.S. filed May 3, 2021).
35. During the COVID-19 pandemic, a number of courts have granted relief to plaintiffs in
their challenges to shutdown orders. See Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020)
(granting injunction pending appeal of orders prohibiting in-person services at the plaintiff church
if the church adheres to public health requirements); Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear,
957 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2020) (granting injunction pending appeal of orders prohibiting drivein services at plaintiff church if the church adheres to public health requirements); Monclova
Christian Acad. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Health Dep’t, No. 20-4300, 2020 WL 7778170, at *4 (6th
Cir. Dec. 31, 2020) (granting plaintiff religious private school’s motion for injunction against
county resolution closing down all public, private, and parochial schools); On Fire Christian Ctr.,
Inc. v. Fischer, 453 F. Supp. 3d 901, 904 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (enjoining Louisville from enforcing
prohibition on drive-in church services against petitioning church); Tabernacle Baptist Church,
Inc. of Nicholasville v. Beshear, 459 F. Supp. 3d 847, 856 (E.D. Ky. 2020) (granting temporary
restraining order and enjoining enforcement of “prohibition on mass gatherings with respect to
any in-person religious service which adheres to applicable social distancing and hygiene guidelines”); Berean Baptist Church v. Cooper, 460 F. Supp. 3d 651, 660, 665 (E.D.N.C. 2020) (granting plaintiffs’ emergency motion for temporary restraining order, enjoining enforcement of
executive order that worship services involving more than ten people be held outside unless “impossible” to hold outdoors); Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser, No. 20-CV-02710, 2020 WL
5995126, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2020) (granting injunctive relief under RFRA to church seeking to
hold “socially-distanced outdoor worship services in which congregants wear masks”). Other
courts have found relief to not be warranted. See Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker,
962 F.3d 341, 343–44 (7th Cir. 2020) (affirming district court’s denial of preliminary injunction,
holding that an Illinois order does not discriminate on the basis of religion); Lawrence v. Colorado, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1072 (D. Colo. 2020) (denying relief to complainant because relief
would not provide redress); Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 472 F. Supp. 3d 926, 1087 (D.N.M.
2020) (denying relief from COVID-19 order); Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, 459 F. Supp. 3d
273, 285, 288 (D. Me. 2020) (finding “Gathering Orders” neutral toward religious organizations
and denying plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order), appeal dismissed, No. 20-1507,
2020 WL 7585178 (1st Cir. Dec. 22, 2020); Spell v. Edwards, 460 F. Supp. 3d 671, 678 (M.D.
La.) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction), order
vacated, appeal dismissed, 962 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding the case moot); Cross Culture
Christian Ctr. v. Newsom, 445 F. Supp. 3d 758, 769–71 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (denying temporary
restraining order on COVID-19 order because court concluded the order was neutral toward religion), appeal dismissed, No. 20-15977, 2020 WL 4813748 (9th Cir. May 29, 2020); Bullock v.
Carney, 463 F. Supp. 3d 519, 525 (D. Del. 2020) (denying request for temporary restraining order
on COVID-19 order), aff’d, 806 F. App’x 157 (3d Cir. 2020), and aff’d, No. 20-2096, 2020 WL
7038527 (3d Cir. June 4, 2020); Solid Rock Baptist Church v. Murphy, 480 F. Supp. 3d 585, 601
(D.N.J. 2020) (finding executive order as to large indoor gatherings neutral and generally applicable and denying plaintiff’s emergency motion for preliminary injunction); Andrew Wommack
Ministries, Inc. v. Polis, No. 20-CV-02922, 2020 WL 5810525, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2020)
(denying plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on COVID19 order); Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, 461 F. Supp. 3d 214, 242 (D. Md. 2020) (denying
plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order of stay-at-home order), appeal dismissed, No.
20-1579, 2020 WL 6787532 (4th Cir. July 6, 2020); Whitsitt v. Newsom, No. 20-cv-00691, 2020
WL 4818780, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2020) (magistrate judge finding stay-at-home order neutral toward religion and recommending the granting of defendant’s motion to dismiss), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 20-cv-00691, 2020 WL 5944195 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2020); see also
Cnty. of L.A. v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, No. 20STCV30695, 2020 WL 6302631, at *1
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CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The constitutional analysis of the COVID-19 shutdown orders is complicated by the fractured landscape of free exercise law. The confusion began with the Court’s 1990 decision, Employment Division v. Smith, a case
involving Native American spiritualists seeking an exemption from a law
banning the use of peyote.36 Prior to Smith, courts generally reviewed government action confronted by free exercise claims with a high degree of
scrutiny;37 Smith unexpectedly and controversially lowered the level of constitutional protection.38 Subsequent legislative and judicial responses to that
decision at the federal and state levels created a patchwork landscape for
adjudicating free exercise claims, introducing different standards of review
depending on the jurisdiction or nature of the claim. For example, if a house
of worship challenged a shutdown order from the federal government, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) would require courts to review
the order with the highest level of judicial scrutiny.39 However, if the challenged shutdown order came from a state or local government, RFRA
would not apply, and the claim would depend on state constitutional and
legislative protections and their interpretations by state courts.40
Regardless of the order’s source, any litigant may also assert a violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, and this was the basis
on which petitioners challenging the orders sought injunctive relief. After
Smith, the first step of the free exercise analysis requires courts to decide
(Cal. Super. Sept. 10, 2020) (granting plaintiff county preliminary injunction against church meeting for indoor worship services). Following Roman Cath. Diocese, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to several petitions, vacated lower court opinions, and remanded in light of the opinion
in Roman Cath. Diocese. See High Plains Harvest Church v. Polis, 141 S. Ct. 527, 527 (2020);
Harvest Rock Church v. Newsom, 141, S. Ct. 889, 889 (2020). Lower courts, following suit,
vacated and remanded district courts in light of Roman Cath. Diocese. See Soos v. Cuomo, No.
20-3737, 2021 WL 37592, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 5, 2021); and S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 981 F.3d 765, 766 (9th Cir. 2020). In December 2020, the Museum of the Bible has
indicated that it might bring suit under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, alleging that the
shuttering of the museum violates that free exercise of religion of employees and visitors. Sarah
Pulliam Bailey & Peggy McGlone, Museum of the Bible considers suing D.C. mayor over virus
shutdown, citing religious freedom claims, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2020, 4:58 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2020/12/23/bible-museum-covid-restrictions-lawsuit/.
36. Emp. Div. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
37. See, e.g., Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403
(1963).
38. Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring) (summarizing the judicial, legislative, and scholarly critiques of Smith).
39. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014) (describing the
RFRA least-restrictive-means standard as “exceptionally demanding”).
40. See, e.g., Maryville Baptist Church, 957 F.3d at 612–13 (holding that a COVID-19 order
likely violated Kentucky’s version of RFRA); On Fire Christian Ctr., Inc., 453 F. Supp. 3d at 913
(same). A later law amending RFRA, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), would possibly, though not at all certainly, increase the level of scrutiny applied to
state and local restrictions. Cross Culture Christian Ctr., 445 F. Supp. 3d at 771 (finding RLUIPA
inapplicable to a COVID-19 shutdown order because order “regulate[s] conduct, not land use”).
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whether the challenged law or regulation is neutral and generally applicable. If the law is both neutral and generally applicable, then the government
action faces only rational basis scrutiny. Under this deferential review of
the challenged regulation, courts need only find a reasonable purpose underlying the action to uphold the action.41 If the law fails either of the neutrality or general applicability prongs, Smith suggests that it should be
subjected to strict scrutiny, which means that the government must show a
narrowly tailored compelling interest.42
To determine neutrality and general applicability, courts generally look
to a case decided three years after Smith: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah.43 In Lukumi, the Court struck down an animal sacrifice restriction that affected practitioners of the Santeria religion. After finding that the restriction failed both the neutrality and general applicability
requirements, the Court applied strict scrutiny and struck down the
regulation.
One important dimension of the Smith-Lukumi test is that the distinct
inquiries into general applicability and compelling interest usually cut in the
same direction. For example, in Lukumi, numerous exemptions for non-religious animal killings indicated that the restriction lacked general applicability.44 But those exemptions also undercut the government’s claim to a
compelling interest: if limiting animal killing was really such an important
interest to justify restrictions on the free exercise of religion, then why were
so many non-religious animal killings permitted?
41. Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, No. 20-3572, 2020 WL 7691715, at *7 (2d Cir. Dec. 28,
2020) (“[A] neutral and generally applicable policy is subject to only rational-basis review.” (citing Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Can. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 763
F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2014))); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (“[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not
be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice.”).
42. Under this test, the government would need to articulate a compelling interest, and its
directive would need to be narrowly tailored toward accomplishing its interest. Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 531–32 (“A law [that is not neutral and generally applicable] must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.”). The “narrowly tailored” requirement is absent from the version of the
strict scrutiny test set forth in RFRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden
to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.”); cf. id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(referencing narrowly tailored prong and arguing “[t]oday’s decision respects these principles”).
For an argument that the Court has been inconsistent in the free exercise context when it comes to
the standard for strict scrutiny, see David Boyle, It’s Time for Scalian Strict Scrutiny to “Strict
Scrutiny” in RFRA, Zubik v. Burwell, and Elsewhere, casetext (Mar. 18, 2016), https://
casetext.com/analysis/its-time-for-scalian-strict-scrutiny-to-strict-scrutiny-in-rfra-zubik-v-burwelland-elsewhere. Boyle characterizes strict scrutiny as consisting of three prongs—compelling state
interest, narrow tailoring, and least-restrictive means—and notes how cases like Lukumi and
Hobby Lobby muddy the waters on the exact formulation. Id.
43. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
44. See id. at 542–46.
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This convergence of general applicability and compelling interest
holds across most free exercise contexts.45 The COVID-19 shutdown orders
provide a rare example of a lack of general applicability in some ways
strengthening the government’s claim to a compelling interest in restricting
religious exercise. Social distancing to prevent the spread of COVID-19
presents a collective-action problem: it only works if most people decide to
follow along,46 even if their own individual preferences would have them
do otherwise. But all shutdown orders include necessary exemptions for
hospitals and certain essential government services, some of which will require large groups of people to congregate. These necessary exceptions increase the risk of spread, which strengthens the compelling nature of the
government’s interest in everybody else’s compliance.47
If COVID-19 shutdown orders only exempted hospitals and essential
government services, then restrictions affecting houses of worship would
likely survive strict scrutiny even though the restrictions would not be generally applicable.48 The complication is that the various challenged orders
exempted a dizzying array of other activities that made the orders far less
generally applicable.49 And, in at least one case, Diocese v. Cuomo, the
45. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015). In a well-known opinion from his time on
the Third Circuit, then-Judge Samuel Alito concluded that a single nonreligious exemption to a
police-department policy prohibiting beards on officers (the nonreligious exemption was for medical conditions) required the department to grant a religious exemption. Fraternal Ord. of Police
Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 367 (3d Cir. 1999).
46. Research suggests that the efficacy of social distancing depends on the number of those
who practice it: “[t]he more participants practiced social distancing, the less likely they were to
have contracted COVID-19 over the next [four months].” Russell H. Fazio, Benjamin Ruisch,
Courtney Moore, Javier Granados Samayoa, Shelby Boggs & Jesse Ladanyi, Social distancing
decreases an individual’s likelihood of contracting COVID-19, PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.
U.S. (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/118/8/e2023131118.full.pdf.
47. The only other example I can think of that works this way is a mandatory vaccination that
requires herd immunity to work. Because some immunocompromised members of the population
are unable to be vaccinated, the state’s interest in vaccinating everyone else (including religious
objectors) might increase as a result of the exemption for those immunocompromised members if
that exemption alone precludes other exemptions due to the necessity of herd immunity. My
thanks to my former student Lilly Wurm for helping me see the connections between vaccines and
free exercise general applicability in a December 2019 seminar paper that predated the COVID-19
pandemic.
48. In such a situation, the government would have a high compelling interest because granting exemptions to grocery stores and hospitals increases the need for reducing exposure elsewhere. Although consider grocery stores in a more lethal and more transmittable pandemic:
officials could likely order home delivery only.
49. In red zones, only essential businesses can be open, dining is takeout only, and schools
are only online; in orange zones, only “high-risk non-essential businesses” must be closed, outdoor dining only, and schools are only online; in yellow zones, businesses are open, indoor and
outdoor dining is permitted, and schools are open. NY Order, supra note 18. “Essential businesses” include hardware stores, bicycle repair services, laundromats, pet food stores, banks, insurance companies, and others. Empire State Dev., Guidance for Determining Whether a Business
Enterprise Is Subject to a Workforce Reduction Under Recent Executive Orders, N.Y. STATE (Oct.
23, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://esd.ny.gov/guidance-executive-order-2026.
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analysis was further complicated by evidence that New York’s regulation
lacked neutrality as well as general applicability.
One final free exercise dimension to these cases is whether the government advanced its compelling interest in slowing the spread of COVID-19
through a narrowly tailored means. For example, if the best scientific evidence suggested that fifty masked and socially distanced congregants could
meet for indoor worship, then a restriction limiting services to ten masked
and socially distanced congregants, or a restriction shutting down in-person
worship entirely, would arguably lack narrow tailoring.50 On the other
hand, if the best scientific evidence suggested that no amount of in-person
worship could be safely conducted, then shutting down worship services
entirely would be narrowly tailored.
Some commentary around these cases suggested that prohibiting inperson worship was permissible because virtual services are fully adequate
substitutes.51 But from a constitutional perspective, if a claimant represents
that virtual worship imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of
religion, then courts are not able to second-guess the soundness of that theological conclusion.52
The preceding analysis covers only the substantive free exercise inquiry in these cases. Because all of the cases came to the Court on petitions
for emergency injunctive relief, the justices also had to consider additional
inquiries. One such issue was the threshold analysis of whether these cases
were appropriately reviewable under the Court’s justiciability doctrine. In
Diocese v. Cuomo, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that they were not.53 A
50. There is, of course, some disagreement as to what counts as the “best scientific evidence.” But at the time of most of the challenged restrictions, there was widespread consensus that
the virus spread most readily through airborne transmission, that non-circulating or poor-circulating airflow contributed to the likelihood of spread, and that wearing masks decreased the risk of
spread. These factors increased the risk of indoor gatherings, particularly those in which participants would be closely gathered and unmasked. The plaintiffs in Diocese v. Cuomo ensured that
their indoor gatherings were distanced and masked, exceeding the guidelines recommended by the
CDC. Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction at 10–11, Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,
141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (No. 20A87).
51. For a theological critique of the adequacy of virtual services, see Esau McCaulley, Why
You Can’t Meet God Over Zoom, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/
24/opinion/zoom-church-christmas-covid-loss.html (describing the inadequacy of virtual
worship).
52. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 723–24 (2014) (noting that
it is not the Court’s place to determine whether a religious belief is reasonable). The move to
virtual services might also raise a different kind of substantial burden claim if it made access more
difficult than in-person worship. Consider a house of worship without the networked infrastructure
to stream virtual services, or with congregants who lack access to computers or Zoom. The move
from in-person to virtual in these circumstances plausibly creates a substantial burden. Theoretically, if that is the only substantial burden (if, in other words, the congregants would be fully
satisfied with virtual worship if they could access it), the state could pay for the technology and
therefore satisfy the least restrictive means analysis.
53. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 75 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
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second inquiry was whether the cases met the standard for emergency relief,
which requires a showing of irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on
the merits.54 There is no indication in South Bay or Calvary Chapel that a
majority of the Court believed these predicates had been met.55 In contrast,
in Diocese v. Cuomo, both the district court and the Supreme Court concluded that the houses of worship had met the standard for irreparable harm.
The Supreme Court also concluded that the litigants had demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits.56
The Court’s denials of injunctive relief in South Bay and Calvary
Chapel generated mixed responses from scholars and pundits. South Bay
received little criticism outside of right-leaning commentators.57 Calvary
54. Id. at 66 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Couns., Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Generally,
a violation of First Amendment rights is always going to be an irreparable harm. Id. at 67 (“The
loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.” (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion))).
55. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1614 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (noting that injunctive relief requires the legal rights be “indisputably clear” and
finding it “improbable” that the government’s limitations were unconstitutional).
56. Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 66–68. The disagreement between Justice Gorsuch
and Chief Justice Roberts regarding a 1905 Supreme Court case is illustrative of the culture-wars
angle discussed infra. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Supreme Court
upheld a Massachusetts law that allowed local boards of health to require and enforce the vaccination of all their inhabitants if “necessary for the public health or . . . safety;” any adult who refused
to comply with the law faced a fine of $5 (about $150 today). Id. at 70–71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Id. at 75–76 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts’s South Bay concurrence cited
Jacobson: “Our Constitution principally entrusts ‘[t]he safety and the health of the people’ to the
politically accountable officials of the States ‘to guard and protect.’” S. Bay United Pentecostal
Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1614 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief)
(quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38). In Diocese v. Cuomo, Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence discusses Jacobson: “Jacobson hardly supports cutting the Constitution loose during a pandemic.”
Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch argued that
Jacobson “involved an entirely different mode of analysis, an entirely different right, and an entirely different kind of restriction.” Id. But Justice Gorsuch then went on to attack the Chief
Justice: “[T]oday the author of the South Bay concurrence even downplays the relevance of
Jacobson for cases like the one before us . . . But it would require a serious rewriting of history to
suggest, as the Chief Justice does, that the South Bay concurrence never really relied in significant
measure on Jacobson. That was the first case South Bay cited on the substantive legal question
before the Court, it was the only case cited involving a pandemic, and many lower courts quite
understandably read its invocation as inviting them to slacken their enforcement of constitutional
liberties while COVID lingers.” Id. at 71 (citations omitted). In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts
replied: “[W]hile Jacobson occupies three pages of today’s concurrence, it warranted exactly one
sentence in South Bay.” Id. at 75 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice then quoted that
sentence and said “[i]t is not clear which part of this lone quotation today’s concurrence finds so
discomfiting. The concurrence speculates that there is so much more to the sentence than meets
the eye, invoking—among other interpretive tools—the new ‘first case cited’ rule. But the actual
proposition should be uncontroversial, and the concurrence must reach beyond the words themselves to find the target it is looking for.” Id. at 76.
57. See Lawrence Friedman, Opinion, Supreme Court rightly allows the states to combat the
coronavirus, THE HILL (Aug. 11, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/511458supreme-court-rightly-allows-the-states-to-combat-the-coronavirus; Ian Millhiser, Why 4 justices
on the Supreme Court voted to reopen churches in the pandemic, VOX (May 30, 2020, 2:05 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/5/30/21275379/supreme-court-churches-roberts-kavanaugh-southbay-united-pentecostal-newsom; Mark Movesian, Quick Thoughts on the California Church-Clo-
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Chapel faced stronger criticisms from across the political spectrum, especially given Nevada’s exemption for casinos.58 But the real firestorm came
after Diocese v. Cuomo.
III.

DIOCESE V. CUOMO

AND THE

CULTURE WARS

To some on the right, Diocese v. Cuomo represented a massive victory
for religious liberty writ large. Megachurch pastor John MacArthur, who
had earlier declared “there is no pandemic” and flouted state restrictions by
holding indoor worship for 7,000 unmasked parishioners, tweeted: “It’s divine providence at work as the Lord uses the death of Ruth Bader Ginsberg,
the hubris of @NYGovCuomo, the determination of @realDonaldTrump,
and the convictions of Justice Barrett to protect the freedom of his
church.”59 California pastor Greg Fairrington cheered the Supreme Court’s
decision from the pulpit the following Sunday.60 Some reactions on the left
were similarly grandiose. Writing in USA Today, law professors Laurence
Tribe and Michael Dorf fretted that Diocese v. Cuomo foreshadowed “the
theocratic and misogynist country in Margaret Atwood’s dystopian ‘The
Handmaid’s Tale.’”61 In a follow-up post, Dorf warned of a “SCOTUS
Theocracy.”62
sure Case, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 2, 2020, 11:03 AM), https://reason.com/
volokh/2020/06/02/quick-thoughts-on-the-california-church-closure-case/. But see Carrie Campbell Severino, The Court Deals a Blow to a Pentecostal Church Just before Pentecost Sunday,
Nat’l Rev. (June 1, 2020, 1:31 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/the-courtdeals-a-blow-to-a-pentecostal-church-just-before-pentecost-sunday.
58. See Matthew T. Martens, Opinion, I told fellow believers our liberties would be protected
in the pandemic. The court proved me wrong., WASH. POST (July 28, 2020, 2:29 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/28/closing-churches-is-grievous-burden-courtsshould-not-impose-it-lightly; Henry Olsen, Opinion, John Roberts strikes again. Conservatives
should be furious., WASH. POST (July 27, 2020, 4:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin
ions/2020/07/27/john-roberts-strikes-again-conservatives-should-be-furious/; Editorial, Rendering
Unto Caesars Palace: The Supreme Court lets Nevada discriminate against churches., WALL ST.
J. (July 26, 2020, 5:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rendering-unto-caesars-palace-11
595798141. But see Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court’s Religious Crusaders Take
On the Pandemic Response, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/30/
opinion/supreme-court-religion-coronavirus.html.
59. John MacArthur (@johnmacarthur), TWITTER (Nov. 26, 2020, 10:22 AM), https://twitter.
com/johnmacarthur/status/1331996773217431557?s=20.
60. Dale Kasler, “Biblical mandate”: California churches ready to defy Newsom after Supreme Court ruling, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/ar
ticle247507750.html (reporting that Fairrington “opened Sunday’s service by pulling out his cell
phone and reading aloud from a fresh U.S. Supreme Court decision” and “then looked out at his
congregants at Destiny Church and shouted: ‘The Supreme Court of the United States of America
— yeah! We have a biblical mandate and First Amendment rights!’”).
61. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Opinion, To this Supreme Court, religious freedom trumps public health – even amid COVID-19 plague, USA TODAY (updated Nov. 29, 2020,
4:38 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/11/29/religious-rights-trump-covid-ill
ness-deaths-supreme-court-column/6436196002.
62. Michael C. Dorf, Under-reacting to SCOTUS Theocracy, DORF ON LAW (Dec. 2, 2020,
11:03 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2020/12/under-reacting-to-scotus-theocracy.html.
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The narrow ruling in Diocese v. Cuomo hardly justifies these reactions.
To reach its decision, five justices decided complicated—and not entirely
black-and-white—questions about legal standing, the standard for injunctive relief, and the application of free exercise law. Collectively, they reasoned, these facts merited granting the relief. Reasonable minds can differ
about the Court’s conclusions, but the limited ruling has little direct influence on constitutional doctrine.63
Seen through a cultural rather than a constitutional lens, Diocese v.
Cuomo signaled a great deal more. One reason is that Justice Amy Coney
Barrett’s vote was likely outcome-determinative. In South Bay and Calvary
Chapel, with Justice Ginsburg still on the bench, the Court had denied injunctive relief. During Justice Barrett’s confirmation hearing, commentators
and pundits had emphasized the symbolism of Justice Barrett replacing Justice Ginsburg.64 Many of them had forecasted significant changes in the
Court’s decisions, even though Barrett represented the sixth reliably conservative vote on a court in which the fifth vote matters most.65 But at least
in some cases, Justice Barrett’s replacement of Justice Ginsburg would
make the difference. And Diocese v. Cuomo was not only the first of
these—it was a case involving the hot-button issue of religious freedom.
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s inflammatory concurrence also raised the temperature in Diocese v. Cuomo.66 Passages like this one seem designed to
poke the reader skeptical of the Court’s decision:
[T]he Governor has chosen to impose no capacity restrictions on
certain businesses he considers “essential.” And it turns out the
businesses the Governor considers essential include hardware
stores, acupuncturists, and liquor stores. Bicycle repair shops, certain signage companies, accountants, lawyers, and insurance
63. Dorf and Tribe’s rhetoric mirrors worries on the cultural right that Sharia law is going to
undermine the Constitution. See Philip Bump, How sharia law became embedded in our political
debate, WASH. POST (July 15, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/
wp/2016/01/08/how-sharia-law-became-embedded-in-our-politics/.
64. See, e.g., Ross Douthat, The Meaning of Amy Coney Barrett, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/26/opinion/amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court.html
(“[A]s the Notorious R.B.G., . . . [Justice Ginsburg] embodied liberal feminism, a history of
struggle and achievement condensed into three initials and one life. Amy Coney Barrett, President
Trump’s choice to take her seat, is a signifier of a different sort.”); Lara Bazelon, Amy Coney
Barrett Is No Ruth Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
09/26/opinion/amy-coney-barrett-nominee.html (“Judge Barrett . . . has impeccable . . . credentials
—and a record that stands in stark contrast to Justice Ginsburg’s.”).
65. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 64 (“Make no mistake: Judge Barrett’s confirmation will
be the wrecking ball that finally smashes Roe v. Wade and undoes the Affordable Care Act. Her
crucial vote on these cases and so many others will undo decades of the progress that Justice
Ginsburg worked her whole life to achieve.”); Ian Millhiser, Who is Amy Coney Barrett, Trump’s
nominee to the Supreme Court?, VOX (Sept. 26, 2020, 5:04 PM), https://www.vox.com/21446700/
amy-coney-barrett-trump-supreme-court (predicting that Justice Barrett would vote to undercut
Obamacare, significantly expand the Second Amendment, and restrict abortion rights).
66. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 69 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
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agents are all essential too. So, at least according to the Governor,
it may be unsafe to go to church, but it is always fine to pick up
another bottle of wine, shop for a new bike, or spend the afternoon exploring your distal points and meridians. Who knew public health would so perfectly align with secular convenience?67
Here and elsewhere, Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence harnesses the kind of
rhetoric that neglects judicial temperament and confuses “constitutional decisions with cosmic battles.”68 Justice Gorsuch isn’t the only jurist who
laces his prose with quotable zingers and hyperbolic claims, but the context
of this decision made his words stand out in relief.69
On the other hand, it’s just a concurrence, and none of the other Justices joined it. A solo concurrence rarely has precedential value and hardly
portends a jurisprudential sea change.70 Nor is Justice Barrett’s vote utterly
shocking. The Court’s denial of injunctive relief in Calvary Chapel was met
with fierce criticism, and the New York restrictions at issue in Diocese v.
Cuomo were even more severe than Nevada’s restrictions. Given this history, it’s not entirely surprising that Justice Barrett sided with the majority.
The bigger reason for the outsized reactions to Diocese v. Cuomo
might not be the decision itself but its symbolic connections to the culture
wars: the particular mix of law, science, and policy infusing legal challenges to COVID-19-related restrictions;71 the fear by some religious conservatives that the government is out to get them and using public health
67. Id.
68. See H. Jefferson Powell, Judges as Superheroes: The Danger of Confusing Constitutional Decisions with Cosmic Battles, 72 S.C. L. REV. 917 (2021).
69. Justice Gorsuch’s subsequent concurrence in South Bay II—a statement joined by Justice
Alito and Justice Thomas—was notably more restrained. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 718 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“No one before us disputes that
factors like these may increase the risk of transmitting COVID-19. And no one need doubt that the
State has a compelling interest in reducing that risk. This Court certainly is not downplaying the
suffering many have experienced in this pandemic.”). In contrast, Justice Kagan’s dissent in South
Bay II is less measured. See id. at 722 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Is it that the Court does not believe
the science, or does it think even the best science must give way?”); id. at 723 (critiquing the
Court’s “armchair epidemiology”).
70. The primary exception is “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,” in which case “the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on
the narrowest grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Ga.,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). This rule has been
instrumental in lower court decisions following June Medical Serv. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103
(2020), where Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence is arguably the narrowest. See, e.g., Hopkins v.
Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding the Chief Justice’s concurrence controlling).
But see Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 972 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding that the
Chief Justice’s concurrence did not change the undue burden test because his concurrence and the
plurality did not agree on “common denominator”).
71. See Jennifer Frey, Political Wisdom and the Limits of Expertise, BREAKING GROUND
(July 2, 2020), https://breakingground.us/political-wisdom-and-the-limits-of-expertise.
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restrictions as a cover to trample their religious freedom;72 and the anxiety
of some progressives that Justice Barrett and her conservative colleagues
will use religious freedom to entrench a kind of social conservatism in Supreme Court jurisprudence that will burden and restrain progressive causes
for a generation.73
Seen in this light, Diocese v. Cuomo and the COVID-19 free exercise
cases that followed are relatively narrow rulings with a broad, expressive
wake: Justice Barrett’s first outcome-determinative votes in religion cases
ensuring a torrent of hot takes, Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Diocese v.
Cuomo fueling the fire, and commentators eyeing other culture wars cases
on the horizon. The next section explores some of these larger cultural
implications.74
IV.

BROADER IMPLICATIONS

The reactions to Diocese v. Cuomo and other free exercise challenges
to COVID-19 restrictions point to broader cultural trends that may play into
future religion cases outside of the pandemic context. As the Court turns to
these other cases, it will need to confront three issues highlighted in the
COVID-19 cases: the importance of religion, the nature of a substantial
burden, and the inevitability of balancing. Each of these issues is a necessary part of free exercise analysis, and the COVID-19 cases illustrate the
combustible nature of all of them.
A. The Importance of Religion
In one sense, every free exercise challenge asks courts to opine on the
importance of religion and the extent to which it might be limited by government interests. But the COVID-19 cases amplified this question through
a linguistic happenstance: the labeling of some activities exempted from
72. See Nathanael Blake, Supreme Court Supports Democrat Efforts To Make Christians
Second-Class Citizens, FEDERALIST (Aug. 4, 2020), https://thefederalist.com/2020/08/04/supremecourt-supports-democrat-efforts-to-make-christians-second-class-citizens.
73. See Howard Gillman & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Weaponization of the Free-Exercise
Clause, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/
weaponization-free-exercise-clause/616373/ (arguing that the Supreme Court’s conservative majority is turning the Free Exercise Clause into a sword for “politically powerful Christian conservatives” to “flout” discrimination laws).
74. Because I am focusing on the substantive free exercise implications of the Court’s
COVID-19 decisions, I do not address procedural critiques against the Court’s handling of these
cases. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Supreme Court Is Making New Law in the Shadows, N.Y.
TIMES (April 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/15/opinion/supreme-court-religion-or
ders.html (“Reasonable minds will disagree on [Tandon’s] standard for free exercise claims. But a
far more glaring problem with the court’s decision is that it wasn’t an appropriate moment to
reach it. Like so many of the justices’ more controversial rulings in the last few years, this one
came on the court’s ‘shadow docket,’ and in a context in which the Supreme Court’s own rules
supposedly limit relief to cases in which the law is ‘indisputably clear.’ Whatever else might be
said about it, this case, Tandon v. Newsom, didn’t meet that standard.”).
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shutdown orders as “essential” and the implication that others were “nonessential.”75
From a constitutional perspective, the question of whether worship is
“essential” is easily answered: religious worship (and the free exercise of
religion more generally) is a fundamental civil liberty. There is no question
that the right to religious worship is “essential.”76 That doesn’t mean the
right is absolute; to the contrary, worship and any other First Amendment
activity can be subjected to some regulations and constraints. But worship
is important, fundamental, and essential.
It’s understandable that state and local officials would deem certain
activities (like hospitals) “essential” and others “non-essential” for purposes
of implementing shutdown orders and restrictions. But it’s also an unfortunate word choice, leading to heightened emotions that could have been
avoided with a more cumbersome but less charged distinction like “services
required to stay open to fight the pandemic” and “services not required to
stay open to fight the pandemic.”77
75. Empire State Dev., supra note 49; Nev. Declaration, supra note 14; Ned Lamont, Conn.
Exec. Order No. 7H (Mar. 20, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of-the-Governor/Execu
tive-Orders/Lamont-Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No-7H.pdf (requiring non-essential businesses or not-for-profits to reduce in-person workforces by 100 percent and categorizing essential
businesses as including critical infrastructure sectors, essential health care operations, essential
retail, banks, insurance companies, and pest control, among others); see also Aaron RadfordWattley, What is a nonessential business?, FOX BUS. (May 8, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.
com/lifestyle/what-is-a-non-essential-business (offering general categories of non-essential businesses); Essential v. Nonessential Businesses, JUSTIA (updated Apr. 2020), https://
www.justia.com/covid-19/business-assistance-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic/essential-vsnonessential-businesses (noting that there is “agreement among many states” that businesses
“geared toward recreation and entertainment” are considered non-essential).
76. The same is also true of the right to protest. In April 2020, the Raleigh Police Department’s official Twitter account tweeted that “protesting is a non-essential activity.” Jeff Reeves,
Raleigh police release statement after department tweets ‘protesting is a non-essential activity’,
CBS 17 (updated Apr. 14, 2020, 9:40 PM), https://www.cbs17.com/news/local-news/wakecounty-news/raleigh-police-release-statement-after-department-tweets-protesting-is-a-non-essen
tial-activity/.
77. Others have also taken issue with labeling religion “non-essential.” See Peggy Fletcher
Stack, Religion is essential, even during a pandemic, Latter-day Saint apostle David Bednar tells
global forum, SALT LAKE TRIB. (updated Oct. 14, 2020, 6:03 PM), https://www.sltrib.com/religion/2020/10/14/religion-is-essential/; Jill Colvin & Zeke Miller, Trump declares churches ‘essential,’ calls on them to reopen, AP NEWS (May 22, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/
8a34b6599602dbd751f2c1fcb93387fe; Editorial, In our opinion: When government mistakes religion as ‘nonessential’, DESERET NEWS (Oct. 16, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.deseret.com/opin
ion/2020/10/16/21516185/bednar-religion-essential-pandemic-covid-19-g20-interfaith-forum (“It
is a critical failure of some governments that they did not recognize religion as essential . . . .”); cf.
Kevin J. Jones, Former Judge: Coronavirus Restrictions Have a Place, but Religion is ‘Essential’,
CATH. TEL. (May 15, 2020), https:// www.thecatholictelegraph.com/covid-19-restrictions-religionessential/66260 (describing Judge Michael McConnell’s argument that while some restrictions on
religious exercise are appropriate, “religious worship is essential.”). But see Rick Aaron, Are religious services ‘essential’ during the pandemic?, ABC4 NEWS (updated Oct. 14, 2020, 5:57 PM),
https://www.abc4.com/ news/top-stories/are-religious-services-essential-during-the-pandemic/
(noting Atheists of Utah President’s statement that religion is “not an essential service like they
talk about . . . . I don’t think religion is essential.”). One Pew Research survey found that eight-in-
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B. Substantial Burden
A second and distinct question is whether the shutdown orders and
restrictions substantially burdened religious exercise. Free exercise doctrine
has long required a threshold determination of substantial burden.78 The
analysis is confusing and at times contested.79 Perhaps most notoriously,
the Supreme Court concluded that a United States Forest Service road being
built through a Native American holy ground did not substantially burden
religious practice.80 In other cases, the justices have disagreed about what
qualifies as a substantial burden.81
Despite this confusion, two aspects of substantial burden are clear.
First, restrictions on religious worship amount to a substantial burden.82
Second, whether a proposed alternative alleviates that burden is generally a
ten Americans think that “houses of worship should be required to follow the same rules about
social distancing and large gatherings as other organizations or businesses in their local area.”
Americans Oppose Religious Exemptions from Coronavirus-Related Restrictions, PEW RES. CTR.
(Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.pewforum.org/2020/08/07/americans-oppose-religious-exemptionsfrom-coronavirus-related-restrictions/.
78. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988) (finding it
unnecessary for the government to demonstrate a compelling need to engage in its activity because the activity did not legally burden the claimant).
79. See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Substantial Confusion about “Substantial Burdens”, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 30 (2016) (“How are courts supposed to know whether or not the law is
pressuring a person to violate an important or unimportant part of her belief system, or compromising her belief massively or only slightly, without undertaking a searching and (for that reason)
problematic theological inquiry? What to one person might be a slight or ‘attenuated’ imposition
on her religious practice may be to another a very serious cost. Courts cannot and should not have
to adjudicate this point. They should instead assess whether there is a large amount of pressure
(‘substantial’ pressure) being put on the person to violate her beliefs.”).
80. In Lyng, the government did not burden the petitioner’s religious exercise because the
Court found that the government “building . . . a road or . . . harvesting . . . timber on publicly
owned land” was like the government using a Social Security number to identify a person—each
are internal government affairs that do not coerce another person and cannot burden the religious
claimant. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448–49.
81. Compare Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682, 724 (2014) (concluding that it was not
the Court’s place to determine whether providing health insurance coverage for contraception
would substantially burden the exercise of religion), with id. at 758–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a deeply held belief is not sufficient for a RFRA claim but that the Court must
conclude that the plaintiff’s religious exercise is substantially burdened and finding the religious
objection and the action objected too attenuated).
82. See, e.g., Agudath Isr. v. Cuomo, 979 F.3d 177, 181 (2d Cir. 2020) (concluding that an
order, although ultimately constitutional, restricting religious gatherings burdens religious exercise); Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“No one contests that the
orders burden sincere faith practices. . . . Orders prohibiting religious gatherings . . . will chill
worship gatherings.”). But see Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d 418,
439 (E.D. Va. 2020) (concluding that a ten-person limit on religious gatherings did not “substantially burden” the free exercise of religion under the Virginia RFRA statute because the plaintiff
organization could “assemble in groups of ten or fewer more frequently, or [combine] small group
worship . . . with online worship services . . . .”), appeal dismissed, No. 20-1515, 2020 WL
6074341 (4th Cir. Oct. 13, 2020).
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question that courts are not able to answer.83 After Diocese v. Cuomo, at
least one commentator noted that different religious traditions and adherents
had different views about the viability of virtual worship as an alternative to
in-person worship, especially during a pandemic.84 But differences over
that theological question do not factor into the constitutional question of
whether virtual worship is an adequate alternative. If litigants assert that
their religious worship is substantially burdened by virtual rather than by inperson services, courts must generally accept that representation.85
C. Balancing
Each of the preceding questions—whether religion is important and
whether religion is substantially burdened—are heated questions in some
circles. But in the free exercise challenges to COVID-19 restrictions on
worship, they should be straightforward and uncontroversial as a constitutional matter: religion is important and restrictions on religious worship
substantially burden religious exercise. The more difficult constitutional
question is whether the substantial burdening of an important religious activity can be justified by the government’s interests in limiting a pandemic.
The tensions underlying these cases don’t evaporate by asking the right
questions, but the right questions at least help us see more clearly what’s at
stake.
The ultimate legal analysis inevitably comes down to a weighing of
values, or what courts usually refer to as a balancing of interests.86 This
weighing and balancing requires judgments from courts and judges. At best,
these judgments follow a kind of reasoning and restraint that is bounded by
83. See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pa., 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2391
(2020) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The inescapable bottom line is that the accommodation demanded
that parties like the Little Sisters engage in conduct that was a necessary cause of the ultimate
conduct to which they had strong religious objections. . . . Where to draw the line in a chain of
causation that leads to objectionable conduct is a difficult moral question, and our cases have
made it clear that courts cannot override the sincere religious beliefs of an objecting party on that
question.”).
84. Jack Jenkins (@jackmjenkins), TWITTER (Nov. 27, 2020, 12:04 PM), https://twitter.com/
jackmjenkins/status/1332384856467271680?s=20 (“Two things are true at the same time: 1. The
court can do its best to avoid weighing in on theological disputes. 2. Whether the court’s decision
avoids arbitrating theological differences isn’t up to the court—it’s up to the religious groups.
That’s how religion works.”).
85. See Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (noting that it
is not the judiciary’s place to work out whether a petitioner’s religious basis for a claimed burden
accords with his claimed religion). However, if a plaintiff claims that his religious exercise is
being burdened by a pandemic restriction, a court can still inquire into whether the plaintiff’s
religious belief is sincere. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360–61 (2015) (noting that for relief
under RLUIPA, a plaintiff’s “request for an accommodation must be sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation” (citing Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 717 n.28)).
86. In legal terms, the court (assuming that a restriction is narrowly tailored to a government
interest) is asking whether the government’s asserted interest is sufficiently compelling to justify
burdening the litigant’s religious exercise.
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the practice of legal interpretation; at worst, they become politically motivated decisions.87
The free exercise analysis of COVID-19-related restrictions affecting
houses of worship pits a core aspect of religious exercise against a core
government interest in ensuring health and safety. The proper constitutional
framework should require strict scrutiny: has the government adequately
explained a narrowly tailored compelling government interest sufficient to
restrict the fundamental right to the free exercise of religion? But the distortion of free exercise analysis in Employment Division v. Smith and the lack
of clarity on both the neutrality and the general applicability prongs of
Smith’s threshold inquiry complicate this framework. These ambiguities
clouded the Court’s analysis in Diocese v. Cuomo and supercharged the
emotional backlash to the decision. And they will likely do so even more in
future cases.
V. RECENT CASE STUDIES: MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP

AND

FULTON

A. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
To illustrate the implications of the preceding analysis for free exercise
cases outside of pandemic-related restrictions, consider first the Court’s
2018 decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop. In that case, the Supreme Court
found that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s consideration of
whether a baker who refused to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple
because of his religious beliefs “was inconsistent with the State’s obligation
of religious neutrality.”88 The Commission had determined that the baker’s
refusal constituted a violation of a state anti-discrimination law. But in
making this determination, the Commission treated the baker’s “sincere religious beliefs” with “clear and impermissible hostility.”89 Relying on
87. Zalman Rothschild, Free Exercise Partisanship, 107 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2022) (surveying free-exercise cases over the past five years and concluding that “free exercise
partisanship has increased dramatically.”) (manuscript at 13), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3707248. According to Rothschild’s study, “COVID-19-related free exercise
cases had the most jarring results” given that “Democrat-appointed judges sided with the government 100% of the time, while Republican-appointed judges sided with the government 34% of the
time and with religious plaintiffs 66% of the time.” Id. (manuscript at 17).
88. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). The
baker was acknowledged by the Court to be a “devout Christian” and noted that for the baker to
create a wedding cake would be “equivalent to participating in a celebration that is contrary to his
most deeply held beliefs.” Id. at 1724. When two men asked the baker to make a cake for their
wedding—a wedding which would not have been recognized in the baker’s state—the baker said
he would not make one for their wedding but he could “make your birth cakes, shower cakes,
[and] sell you cookies and brownies.” Id. The next day, one of the men’s mothers called the baker
and the baker explained that his refusal was because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage and because his state did not recognize same-sex marriages. Id.
89. Id. at 1729. The Court noted that commissioners had “endorsed the view that religious
beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain,” and that one
commissioner had described the baker’s faith as “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that
people can use.” Id. at 1729–30. The Court further relied on the Commission’s disparate treatment
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Church of Lukumi, the Court held this treatment to violate the Free Exercise
Clause by “act[ing] in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes
the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices.”90
One reason that Masterpiece Cakeshop is relevant to the current inquiry is its treatment of the threshold prongs in Smith of neutrality and
general applicability. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, as in Lukumi and Diocese
v. Cuomo, the Court found not only a lack of general applicability but also a
lack of neutrality, or what the Court refers to as “animus” toward religion.
The shift from “lack of neutrality” to “animus” may be subtle, but it reflects
the move from Smith to post-Smith analysis, and from Justice Antonin
Scalia (who authored Smith) to Justice Anthony Kennedy (who authored
Lukumi and Masterpiece Cakeshop).
The problem with Justice Kennedy’s animus framing is that it is
largely bereft of legal analysis. In fact, this may be one reason the Court
cited Lukumi in Diocese v. Cuomo but steered clear of Masterpiece
Cakeshop. Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion omits entirely
the strict scrutiny analysis purportedly required under Smith. After concluding that the Colorado regulation failed the neutrality prong of Smith’s
threshold analysis, Justice Kennedy struck down the regulation with zero
analysis of the government’s interest or whether the law was narrowly tailored.91 And none of the other Justices took issue with that shortcut.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kennedy focuses instead on subjective judgments about stigma and dignity.92 These are important concepts
that reflect genuine emotional and psychological harms. But they are very
difficult to constitutionalize. This is one reason, for example, that free
speech law generally protects even hateful and emotionally damaging
speech: subjective harms by definition are experienced differently by different people. Society cannot function by allowing anyone subjectively offended to restrict the words and actions that caused that offense.93
of other bakers who had refused to bake cakes which was derogatory toward same-sex marriage,
allowing a conscientious refusal in those cases but not in the instant case. Id. at 1730.
90. Id. at 1731.
91. See Chad Flanders & Sean Oliveira, An Incomplete Masterpiece, 66 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 154, 169 (2019).
92. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728–29 (simultaneously stressing the importance of preventing “all purveyors of goods and services” from objecting to gay marriages because
it would “impose a serious stigma on gay persons” but emphasizing that the baker was “entitled to
the neutral and respectful consideration of his claims . . . .”). This same emotive approach infuses
Justice Kennedy’s opinions in other cases, notably Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) and
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). Reading opinions like Obergefell and Masterpiece
Cakeshop, one gets the sense that Justice Kennedy is trying really hard to broker a peace treaty in
the culture wars between religious conservatives and proponents of gay rights.
93. See generally JOHN INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH
DEEP DIFFERENCE 93–103 (2016) (describing the difficulty of legal restrictions for speech based
on subjective harms).
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By injecting subjective judgments about dignity, the Court made it
much more challenging to weigh the core interests at stake in Masterpiece:
the religious exercise of the baker, on one hand, and the state’s anti-discrimination interest, on the other. Stigma and dignity are difficult to weigh,
and attempting to do so increases the chances that balancing devolves into
politically motivated reasoning. By contrast, focusing the inquiry on the
baker’s burden and the government’s interest helps restrain these impulses—even though no test can completely avoid the dangers inherent in
balancing interests.
The Court’s focus on stigma and dignity opened the door for commentators to highlight these shortcomings. One of the more pronounced features
of commentary surrounding this case was a general lack of empathy in all
directions. Commentators on the right were quick to dismiss the harm experienced by the gay customers and suggested that the lawsuit was nothing
more than an activist sham.94 And on the left, some commentators labeled
Jack Phillips’s claim to religious exercise as thinly-veiled bigotry and rejected his arguments that baking that particular cake would have substantially burdened that exercise.95 This commentary sidestepped the
challenging questions of religion’s importance, substantial burden’s nature,
94. See Richard Epstein, Symposium: The worst form of judicial minimalism — Masterpiece
Cakeshop deserved a full vindication for its claims of religious liberty and free speech, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 4, 2018, 8:29 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-the-worst-formof-judicial-minimalism-masterpiece-cakeshop-deserved-a-full-vindication-for-its-claims-of-religi
ous-liberty-and-free-speech (noting that the same-sex couple “are blessed with multiple choices if
[the anti-discrimination law] does not apply” but that the baker “has no place to run” if the law
applies); Joy Pullmann, 7 Key Takeaways from ACLU Spin On Their Masterpiece Cakeshop Loss,
FEDERALIST (June 7, 2018), https://thefederalist.com/2018/06/07/7-key-takeaways-aclu-spin-masterpiece-cakeshop-loss (describing the same-sex couple’s advocates as using “big money [to] exploit two men’s hurt feelings” and describing the stakes in Masterpiece Cakeshop as “[a] handful
of gay couples having to buy a wedding product from the second small business owner they
consult.”).
95. See Mary Bonauto, Symposium: Commercial products as speech – When a cake is just a
cake, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/symposi
um-commercial-products-speech-cake-just-cake (describing the baker’s case as an attempt to “circumvent the demands of equality” and arguing that cakes are not generally thought to convey the
commercial baker’s message); Curtis M. Wong, Supreme Court’s Cake Case Could Set America
Back 50 Years, Activists Warn, HUFFPOST (Mar. 15, 2018, 2:09 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/masterpiece-cakeshop-piggie-park_n_5aa9d381e4b0600b82ffec48 (describing a coalition of
pro-LGBTQ organization’s advertisement that compares the Masterpiece Cakeshop case to a 1968
case where a barbecue owner “discriminated against a black customer . . . .”); Antonia Blumberg,
Here’s What’s At Stake In the Supreme Court’s Gay Wedding Cake Case, HUFFPOST (updated
Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/supreme-court-gay-wedding-cake-case_n_
5a25925ee4b03350e0b8a7e0 (noting that LGBTQ advocates say the issue in Masterpiece
Cakeshop was “the ability of ordinary commercial businesses to use religion to pick and choose
which parts of anti-discrimination law they’ll obey.”); Vanita Gupta, Symposium: Discrimination
is not a fundamental American value, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 12, 2017, 2:28 PM), https://
www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/symposium-discrimination-not-fundamental-american-value
(“[T]he question in Masterpiece Cakeshop is whether we recognize this human dignity, or instead
grant companies sweeping license to discriminate against millions of our LGBT neighbors and
family members on the basis of personal religious conviction.”).
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and balancing’s difficulty—leading to a rash of culture-wars hot takes that
downplayed the sincerity and humanity of the other side.
B. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia
In 2021, the Court again faced an opportunity to revisit or even overrule Smith. In Fulton, the Court unanimously held that Philadelphia’s refusal to contract with Catholic Social Services (CSS), a Catholic adoption
agency, for foster care services on account of the agency’s policy not to
place foster children with same-sex couples violated the Free Exercise
Clause.96 But the Court declined the petitioner’s invitation to revisit Smith,
concluding that the case “falls outside Smith because the City has burdened
the religious exercise of CSS through policies that do not meet the requirement of being neutral and generally applicable.”97 The Court also avoided
the neutrality analysis of Masterpiece Cakeshop, deciding the case “under
the rubric of general applicability.”98 In doing so, the Court found that a
rule is not generally applicable when it gives state officials discretion to
make exceptions—regardless of whether such exceptions have been
made—because such a rule “‘invite[s]’ the government to decide which
reasons for not complying with the policy are worthy of solicitude.”99
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito)
argued that the Court should have overruled Smith.100 While the Fulton
majority avoided any mention of the Court’s earlier COVID-19 decisions,101 Justice Gorsuch cited Tandon for the view that “exceptions for one
means strict scrutiny for all” and suggested that Tandon “began to resolve
at least some of the confusion surrounding Smith’s application.”102 Justice
Gorsuch also emphasized that “Tandon treated the symptoms, not the underlying ailment.”103
A number of commentators view Fulton as a punt that failed to address
the balance between free exercise protections and government interests, particularly interests related to LGBTQ equality.104 Additionally, by focusing
96. Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
97. Id. at 1872. Three Justices made clear their wish to overrule Smith, see id. at 1924 (Alito,
J., concurring). Two more Justices found “the textual and structural arguments against Smith . . .
compelling.” Id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 1877.
99. Id. at 1879 (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
(1990)). See also id. at 1878 (“No matter the level of deference we extend to the City, the inclusion of a formal system of entirely discretionary exceptions in section 3.21 renders the contractual
non-discrimination requirement not generally applicable.”).
100. Id. at 1926 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
101. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1874–82 (majority opinion).
102. Id. at 1930–31 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 1931.
104. See Richard W. Garnett, After Fulton, Religious Foster Care Agencies Still Vulnerable,
FIRST THINGS (June 22, 2021), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2021/06/after-fultonreligious-foster-care-agencies-still-vulnerable (“Some commentators—as well as three of the jus-
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on secondary analyses under Smith, the Court once again sidestepped more
central questions related to the importance of religion, the nature of a substantial burden, and a balancing of interests analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court’s COVID-19 decisions illustrate the dangers of ignoring important predicate questions about the free exercise of religion. It’s not that
better legal analysis will satisfy everyone. These cases will always be hard,
and many people will focus on outcomes more than the reasoning underlying those outcomes. But a legal analysis focused on the right questions at
least provides the contours for a debate and requires both sides to make
arguments within those contours. And that might be a small step toward
quieting the culture wars.

tices—have said that the Court’s ruling is ‘narrow’ and CSS’s win ephemeral.”). Professor Garnett himself views Fulton as having much broader implications. Id.

